Alcibiades

Wikia prominent Athenian statesman, orator, and general. He was the last of the Alcmaeonidae, which fell from prominence after the Peloponnesian War. He played a major role in the second half of that conflict as a strategic advisor, military commander, and politician.

Alcibiades I

Plato (spurious and doubtful works), 427? BCE-347? BCE

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ALCIBIADES I

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by Plato (see Appendix I)

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Translated by Benjamin Jowett

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APPENDIX I.

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It seems impossible to separate by any exact line the genuine writings of Plato from the spurious.

The only external evidence to them which is of much value is that of Aristotle; for the Alexandrian catalogues of a century later include manifest forgeries.

Even the value of the Aristotelian authority is a good deal impaired by the uncertainty concerning the date and authorship of the writings which are ascribed to him.

And several of the citations of Aristotle omit the name of Plato, and some of them omit the name of the dialogue from which they are taken.

Prior, however, to the enquiry about the writings of a particular author, general considerations which equally affect all evidence to the genuineness of ancient writings are the following: Shorter works are more likely to have been forged, or to have received an erroneous designation, than longer ones; and some kinds of composition, such as epistles or panegyrical orations, are more liable to suspicion than others; those, again, which have a taste of sophistry in them, or the ring of a later age, or the slighter character of a rhetorical exercise, or in which a motive or some affinity to spurious writings can be detected, or which seem to have originated in a name or statement really occurring in some classical author, are also of doubtful credit; while there is no instance of any ancient writing proved to be a forgery, which combines excellence with length.

A really great and original writer would have no object in fathering his works on Plato; and to the forger or imitator, the 'literary hack' of Alexandria and Athens, the Gods did not grant originality or genius.

Further, in attempting to balance the evidence for and against a Platonic dialogue, we must not forget that the form of the Platonic writing was common to several of his contemporaries.

Aeschines, Euclid, Phaedo, Antisthenes, and in the next generation Aristotle, are all said to have composed dialogues; and mistakes of names are very likely to have occurred.

Greek literature in the third century before Christ was almost as voluminous as our own, and without the safeguards of regular publication, or printing, or binding, or even of distinct titles.

An unknown writing was naturally attributed to a known writer whose works bore the same character; and the name once appended easily obtained authority.

A tendency may also be observed to blend the works and opinions of the master with those of his scholars.

To a later Platonist, the difference between Plato and his imitators was not so perceptible as to ourselves.

The Memorabilia of Xenophon and the Dialogues of Plato are but a part of a considerable Socratic literature which has passed away.

And we must consider how we should regard the question of the genuineness of a particular writing, if this lost literature had been preserved to us.

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These considerations lead us to adopt the following criteria of genuineness: (1) That is most certainly Plato's which Aristotle attributes to him by name, which (2) is of considerable length, of (3) great excellence, and also (4) in harmony with the general spirit of the Platonic writings.

But the testimony of Aristotle cannot always be distinguished from that of a later age (see above); and has various degrees of importance.

Those writings which he cites without mentioning Plato, under their own names, e.g.

the Hippias, the Funeral Oration, the Phaedo, etc., have an inferior degree of evidence in their favour.

They may have been supposed by him to be the writings of another, although in the case of really great works, e.g.

the Phaedo, this is not credible; those again which are quoted but not named, are still more defective in their external credentials.

There may be also a possibility that Aristotle was mistaken, or may have confused the master and his scholars in the case of a short writing; but this is inconceivable about a more important work, e.g.

the Laws, especially when we remember that he was living at Athens, and a frequenter of the groves of the Academy, during the last twenty years of Plato's life.

Nor must we forget that in all his numerous citations from the Platonic writings he never attributes any passage found in the extant dialogues to any one but Plato.

And lastly, we may remark that one or two great writings, such as the Parmenides and the Politicus, which are wholly devoid of Aristotelian (1) credentials may be fairly attributed to Plato, on the ground of (2) length, (3) excellence, and (4) accordance with the general spirit of his writings.

Indeed the greater part of the evidence for the genuineness of ancient Greek authors may be summed up under two heads only: (1) excellence; and (2) uniformity of tradition—a kind of evidence, which though in many cases sufficient, is of inferior value.

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Proceeding upon these principles we appear to arrive at the conclusion that nineteen-twentieths of all the writings which have ever been ascribed to Plato, are undoubtedly genuine.

There is another portion of them, including the Epistles, the Epinomis, the dialogues rejected by the ancients themselves, namely, the Axiochus, De justo, De virtute, Demodocus, Sisyphus, Eryxias, which on grounds, both of internal and external evidence, we are able with equal certainty to reject.

But there still remains a small portion of which we are unable to affirm either that they are genuine or spurious.

They may have been written in youth, or possibly like the works of some painters, may be partly or wholly the compositions of pupils; or they may have been the writings of some contemporary transferred by accident to the more celebrated name of Plato, or of some Platonist in the next generation who aspired to imitate his master.

Not that on grounds either of language or philosophy we should lightly reject them.

Some difference of style, or inferiority of execution, or inconsistency of thought, can hardly be considered decisive of their spurious character.

For who always does justice to himself, or who writes with equal care at all times?

Certainly not Plato, who exhibits the greatest differences in dramatic power, in the formation of sentences, and in the use of words, if his earlier writings are compared with his later ones, say the Protagoras or Phaedrus with the Laws.

Or who can be expected to think in the same manner during a period of authorship extending over above fifty years, in an age of great intellectual activity, as well as of political and literary transition?

Certainly not Plato, whose earlier writings are separated from his later ones by as wide an interval of philosophical speculation as that which separates his later writings from Aristotle.

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The dialogues which have been translated in the first Appendix, and which appear to have the next claim to genuineness among the Platonic writings, are the Lesser Hippias, the Menexenus or Funeral Oration, the First Alcibiades.

Of these, the Lesser Hippias and the Funeral Oration are cited by Aristotle; the first in the Metaphysics, the latter in the Rhetoric.

Neither of them are expressly attributed to Plato, but in his citation of both of them he seems to be referring to passages in the extant dialogues.

From the mention of 'Hippias' in the singular by Aristotle, we may perhaps infer that he was unacquainted with a second dialogue bearing the same name.

Moreover, the mere existence of a Greater and Lesser Hippias, and of a First and Second Alcibiades, does to a certain extent throw a doubt upon both of them.

Though a very clever and ingenious work, the Lesser Hippias does not appear to contain anything beyond the power of an imitator, who was also a careful student of the earlier Platonic writings, to invent.

The motive or leading thought of the dialogue may be detected in Xen.

Mem., and there is no similar instance of a 'motive' which is taken from Xenophon in an undoubted dialogue of Plato.

On the other hand, the upholders of the genuineness of the dialogue will find in the Hippias a true Socratic spirit; they will compare the Ion as being akin both in subject and treatment; they will urge the authority of Aristotle; and they will detect in the treatment of the Sophist, in the satirical reasoning upon Homer, in the reductio ad absurdum of the doctrine that vice is ignorance, traces of a Platonic authorship.

In reference to the last point we are doubtful, as in some of the other dialogues, whether the author is asserting or overthrowing the paradox of Socrates, or merely following the argument 'whither the wind blows.'

That no conclusion is arrived at is also in accordance with the character of the earlier dialogues.

The resemblances or imitations of the Gorgias, Protagoras, and Euthydemus, which have been observed in the Hippias, cannot with certainty be adduced on either side of the argument.

On the whole, more may be said in favour of the genuineness of the Hippias than against it.

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The Menexenus or Funeral Oration is cited by Aristotle, and is interesting as supplying an example of the manner in which the orators praised 'the Athenians among the Athenians,' falsifying persons and dates, and casting a veil over the gloomier events of Athenian history.

It exhibits an acquaintance with the funeral oration of Thucydides, and was, perhaps, intended to rival that great work.

If genuine, the proper place of the Menexenus would be at the end of the Phaedrus.

The satirical opening and the concluding words bear a great resemblance to the earlier dialogues; the oration itself is professedly a mimetic work, like the speeches in the Phaedrus, and cannot therefore be tested by a comparison of the other writings of Plato.

The funeral oration of Pericles is expressly mentioned in the Phaedrus, and this may have suggested the subject, in the same manner that the Cleitophon appears to be suggested by the slight mention of Cleitophon and his attachment to Thrasymachus in the Republic; and the Theages by the mention of Theages in the Apology and Republic; or as the Second Alcibiades seems to be founded upon the text of Xenophon, Mem.

A similar taste for parody appears not only in the Phaedrus, but in the Protagoras, in the Symposium, and to a certain extent in the Parmenides.

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To these two doubtful writings of Plato I have added the First Alcibiades, which, of all the disputed dialogues of Plato, has the greatest merit, and is somewhat longer than any of them, though not verified by the testimony of Aristotle, and in many respects at variance with the Symposium in the description of the relations of Socrates and Alcibiades.

Like the Lesser Hippias and the Menexenus, it is to be compared to the earlier writings of Plato.

The motive of the piece may, perhaps, be found in that passage of the Symposium in which Alcibiades describes himself as self-convicted by the words of Socrates.

For the disparaging manner in which Schleiermacher has spoken of this dialogue there seems to be no sufficient foundation.

At the same time, the lesson imparted is simple, and the irony more transparent than in the undoubted dialogues of Plato.

We know, too, that Alcibiades was a favourite thesis, and that at least five or six dialogues bearing this name passed current in antiquity, and are attributed to contemporaries of Socrates and Plato.

(1) In the entire absence of real external evidence (for the catalogues of the Alexandrian librarians cannot be regarded as trustworthy); and (2) in the absence of the highest marks either of poetical or philosophical excellence; and (3) considering that we have express testimony to the existence of contemporary writings bearing the name of Alcibiades, we are compelled to suspend our judgment on the genuineness of the extant dialogue.

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Neither at this point, nor at any other, do we propose to draw an absolute line of demarcation between genuine and spurious writings of Plato.

They fade off imperceptibly from one class to another.

There may have been degrees of genuineness in the dialogues themselves, as there are certainly degrees of evidence by which they are supported.

The traditions of the oral discourses both of Socrates and Plato may have formed the basis of semi-Platonic writings; some of them may be of the same mixed character which is apparent in Aristotle and Hippocrates, although the form of them is different.

But the writings of Plato, unlike the writings of Aristotle, seem never to have been confused with the writings of his disciples: this was probably due to their definite form, and to their inimitable excellence.

The three dialogues which we have offered in the Appendix to the criticism of the reader may be partly spurious and partly genuine; they may be altogether spurious;—that is an alternative which must be frankly admitted.

Nor can we maintain of some other dialogues, such as the Parmenides, and the Sophist, and Politicus, that no considerable objection can be urged against them, though greatly overbalanced by the weight (chiefly) of internal evidence in their favour.

Nor, on the other hand, can we exclude a bare possibility that some dialogues which are usually rejected, such as the Greater Hippias and the Cleitophon, may be genuine.

The nature and object of these semi-Platonic writings require more careful study and more comparison of them with one another, and with forged writings in general, than they have yet received, before we can finally decide on their character.

We do not consider them all as genuine until they can be proved to be spurious, as is often maintained and still more often implied in this and similar discussions; but should say of some of them, that their genuineness is neither proven nor disproven until further evidence about them can be adduced.

And we are as confident that the Epistles are spurious, as that the Republic, the Timaeus, and the Laws are genuine.

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On the whole, not a twentieth part of the writings which pass under the name of Plato, if we exclude the works rejected by the ancients themselves and two or three other plausible inventions, can be fairly doubted by those who are willing to allow that a considerable change and growth may have taken place in his philosophy (see above).

That twentieth debatable portion scarcely in any degree affects our judgment of Plato, either as a thinker or a writer, and though suggesting some interesting questions to the scholar and critic, is of little importance to the general reader.

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ALCIBIADES I

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INTRODUCTION.

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The First Alcibiades is a conversation between Socrates and Alcibiades.

Socrates is represented in the character which he attributes to himself in the Apology of a know-nothing who detects the conceit of knowledge in others.

The two have met already in the Protagoras and in the Symposium; in the latter dialogue, as in this, the relation between them is that of a lover and his beloved.

But the narrative of their loves is told differently in different places; for in the Symposium Alcibiades is depicted as the impassioned but rejected lover; here, as coldly receiving the advances of Socrates, who, for the best of purposes, lies in wait for the aspiring and ambitious youth.

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Alcibiades, who is described as a very young man, is about to enter on public life, having an inordinate opinion of himself, and an extravagant ambition.

Socrates, 'who knows what is in man,' astonishes him by a revelation of his designs.

But has he the knowledge which is necessary for carrying them out?

He is going to persuade the Athenians—about what?

Not about any particular art, but about politics—when to fight and when to make peace.

Now, men should fight and make peace on just grounds, and therefore the question of justice and injustice must enter into peace and war; and he who advises the Athenians must know the difference between them.

Does Alcibiades know?

If he does, he must either have been taught by some master, or he must have discovered the nature of them himself.

If he has had a master, Socrates would like to be informed who he is, that he may go and learn of him also.

Alcibiades admits that he has never learned.

Then has he enquired for himself?

He may have, if he was ever aware of a time when he was ignorant.

But he never was ignorant; for when he played with other boys at dice, he charged them with cheating, and this implied a knowledge of just and unjust.

According to his own explanation, he had learned of the multitude.

Why, he asks, should he not learn of them the nature of justice, as he has learned the Greek language of them?

To this Socrates answers, that they can teach Greek, but they cannot teach justice; for they are agreed about the one, but they are not agreed about the other: and therefore Alcibiades, who has admitted that if he knows he must either have learned from a master or have discovered for himself the nature of justice, is convicted out of his own mouth.

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Alcibiades rejoins, that the Athenians debate not about what is just, but about what is expedient; and he asserts that the two principles of justice and expediency are opposed.

Socrates, by a series of questions, compels him to admit that the just and the expedient coincide.

Alcibiades is thus reduced to the humiliating conclusion that he knows nothing of politics, even if, as he says, they are concerned with the expedient.

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However, he is no worse than other Athenian statesmen; and he will not need training, for others are as ignorant as he is.

He is reminded that he has to contend, not only with his own countrymen, but with their enemies—with the Spartan kings and with the great king of Persia; and he can only attain this higher aim of ambition by the assistance of Socrates.

Not that Socrates himself professes to have attained the truth, but the questions which he asks bring others to a knowledge of themselves, and this is the first step in the practice of virtue.

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The dialogue continues:—We wish to become as good as possible.

But to be good in what?

Alcibiades replies—'Good in transacting business.'

But what business?

'The business of the most intelligent men at Athens.'

The cobbler is intelligent in shoemaking, and is therefore good in that; he is not intelligent, and therefore not good, in weaving.

Is he good in the sense which Alcibiades means, who is also bad?

'I mean,' replies Alcibiades, 'the man who is able to command in the city.'

But to command what—horses or men?

and if men, under what circumstances?

'I mean to say, that he is able to command men living in social and political relations.'

And what is their aim?

'The better preservation of the city.'

But when is a city better?

'When there is unanimity, such as exists between husband and wife.'

Then, when husbands and wives perform their own special duties, there can be no unanimity between them; nor can a city be well ordered when each citizen does his own work only.

Alcibiades, having stated first that goodness consists in the unanimity of the citizens, and then in each of them doing his own separate work, is brought to the required point of self-contradiction, leading him to confess his own ignorance.

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But he is not too old to learn, and may still arrive at the truth, if he is willing to be cross-examined by Socrates.

He must know himself; that is to say, not his body, or the things of the body, but his mind, or truer self.

The physician knows the body, and the tradesman knows his own business, but they do not necessarily know themselves.

Self-knowledge can be obtained only by looking into the mind and virtue of the soul, which is the diviner part of a man, as we see our own image in another's eye.

And if we do not know ourselves, we cannot know what belongs to ourselves or belongs to others, and are unfit to take a part in political affairs.

Both for the sake of the individual and of the state, we ought to aim at justice and temperance, not at wealth or power.

The evil and unjust should have no power,—they should be the slaves of better men than themselves.

None but the virtuous are deserving of freedom.

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And are you, Alcibiades, a freeman?

'I feel that I am not; but I hope, Socrates, that by your aid I may become free, and from this day forward I will never leave you.'

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The Alcibiades has several points of resemblance to the undoubted dialogues of Plato.

The process of interrogation is of the same kind with that which Socrates practises upon the youthful Cleinias in the Euthydemus; and he characteristically attributes to Alcibiades the answers which he has elicited from him.

The definition of good is narrowed by successive questions, and virtue is shown to be identical with knowledge.

Here, as elsewhere, Socrates awakens the consciousness not of sin but of ignorance.

Self-humiliation is the first step to knowledge, even of the commonest things.

No man knows how ignorant he is, and no man can arrive at virtue and wisdom who has not once in his life, at least, been convicted of error.

The process by which the soul is elevated is not unlike that which religious writers describe under the name of 'conversion,' if we substitute the sense of ignorance for the consciousness of sin.

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In some respects the dialogue differs from any other Platonic composition.

The aim is more directly ethical and hortatory; the process by which the antagonist is undermined is simpler than in other Platonic writings, and the conclusion more decided.

There is a good deal of humour in the manner in which the pride of Alcibiades, and of the Greeks generally, is supposed to be taken down by the Spartan and Persian queens; and the dialogue has considerable dialectical merit.

But we have a difficulty in supposing that the same writer, who has given so profound and complex a notion of the characters both of Alcibiades and Socrates in the Symposium, should have treated them in so thin and superficial a manner in the Alcibiades, or that he would have ascribed to the ironical Socrates the rather unmeaning boast that Alcibiades could not attain the objects of his ambition without his help; or that he should have imagined that a mighty nature like his could have been reformed by a few not very conclusive words of Socrates.

For the arguments by which Alcibiades is reformed are not convincing; the writer of the dialogue, whoever he was, arrives at his idealism by crooked and tortuous paths, in which many pitfalls are concealed.

The anachronism of making Alcibiades about twenty years old during the life of his uncle, Pericles, may be noted; and the repetition of the favourite observation, which occurs also in the Laches and Protagoras, that great Athenian statesmen, like Pericles, failed in the education of their sons.

There is none of the undoubted dialogues of Plato in which there is so little dramatic verisimilitude.

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ALCIBIADES I

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Plato (see Appendix I above)

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Translated by Benjamin Jowett

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Alcibiades, Socrates.

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SOCRATES

I dare say that you may be surprised to find, O son of Cleinias, that I, who am your first lover, not having spoken to you for many years, when the rest of the world were wearying you with their attentions, am the last of your lovers who still speaks to you.

The cause of my silence has been that I was hindered by a power more than human, of which I will some day explain to you the nature; this impediment has now been removed; I therefore here present myself before you, and I greatly hope that no similar hindrance will again occur.

Meanwhile, I have observed that your pride has been too much for the pride of your admirers; they were numerous and high-spirited, but they have all run away, overpowered by your superior force of character; not one of them remains.

And I want you to understand the reason why you have been too much for them.

You think that you have no need of them or of any other man, for you have great possessions and lack nothing, beginning with the body, and ending with the soul.

In the first place, you say to yourself that you are the fairest and tallest of the citizens, and this every one who has eyes may see to be true; in the second place, that you are among the noblest of them, highly connected both on the father's and the mother's side, and sprung from one of the most distinguished families in your own state, which is the greatest in Hellas, and having many friends and kinsmen of the best sort, who can assist you when in need; and there is one potent relative, who is more to you than all the rest, Pericles the son of Xanthippus, whom your father left guardian of you, and of your brother, and who can do as he pleases not only in this city, but in all Hellas, and among many and mighty barbarous nations.

Moreover, you are rich; but I must say that you value yourself least of all upon your possessions.

And all these things have lifted you up; you have overcome your lovers, and they have acknowledged that you were too much for them.

Have you not remarked their absence?

And now I know that you wonder why I, unlike the rest of them, have not gone away, and what can be my motive in remaining.

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ALCIBIADES

Perhaps, Socrates, you are not aware that I was just going to ask you the very same question—What do you want?

And what is your motive in annoying me, and always, wherever I am, making a point of coming?

(Compare Symp.)

I do really wonder what you mean, and should greatly like to know.

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SOCRATES

Then if, as you say, you desire to know, I suppose that you will be willing to hear, and I may consider myself to be speaking to an auditor who will remain, and will not run away?

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ALCIBIADES

Certainly, let me hear.

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SOCRATES

You had better be careful, for I may very likely be as unwilling to end as I have hitherto been to begin.

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ALCIBIADES

Proceed, my good man, and I will listen.

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SOCRATES

I will proceed; and, although no lover likes to speak with one who has no feeling of love in him (compare Symp.

), I will make an effort, and tell you what I meant: My love, Alcibiades, which I hardly like to confess, would long ago have passed away, as I flatter myself, if I saw you loving your good things, or thinking that you ought to pass life in the enjoyment of them.

But I shall reveal other thoughts of yours, which you keep to yourself; whereby you will know that I have always had my eye on you.

Suppose that at this moment some God came to you and said: Alcibiades, will you live as you are, or die in an instant if you are forbidden to make any further acquisition?—I verily believe that you would choose death.

And I will tell you the hope in which you are at present living: Before many days have elapsed, you think that you will come before the Athenian assembly, and will prove to them that you are more worthy of honour than Pericles, or any other man that ever lived, and having proved this, you will have the greatest power in the state.

When you have gained the greatest power among us, you will go on to other Hellenic states, and not only to Hellenes, but to all the barbarians who inhabit the same continent with us.

And if the God were then to say to you again: Here in Europe is to be your seat of empire, and you must not cross over into Asia or meddle with Asiatic affairs, I do not believe that you would choose to live upon these terms; but the world, as I may say, must be filled with your power and name—no man less than Cyrus and Xerxes is of any account with you.

Such I know to be your hopes—I am not guessing only—and very likely you, who know that I am speaking the truth, will reply, Well, Socrates, but what have my hopes to do with the explanation which you promised of your unwillingness to leave me?

And that is what I am now going to tell you, sweet son of Cleinias and Dinomache.

The explanation is, that all these designs of yours cannot be accomplished by you without my help; so great is the power which I believe myself to have over you and your concerns; and this I conceive to be the reason why the God has hitherto forbidden me to converse with you, and I have been long expecting his permission.

For, as you hope to prove your own great value to the state, and having proved it, to attain at once to absolute power, so do I indulge a hope that I shall be the supreme power over you, if I am able to prove my own great value to you, and to show you that neither guardian, nor kinsman, nor any one is able to deliver into your hands the power which you desire, but I only, God being my helper.

When you were young (compare Symp.)

and your hopes were not yet matured, I should have wasted my time, and therefore, as I conceive, the God forbade me to converse with you; but now, having his permission, I will speak, for now you will listen to me.

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ALCIBIADES

Your silence, Socrates, was always a surprise to me.

I never could understand why you followed me about, and now that you have begun to speak again, I am still more amazed.

Whether I think all this or not, is a matter about which you seem to have already made up your mind, and therefore my denial will have no effect upon you.

But granting, if I must, that you have perfectly divined my purposes, why is your assistance necessary to the attainment of them?

Can you tell me why?

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SOCRATES

You want to know whether I can make a long speech, such as you are in the habit of hearing; but that is not my way.

I think, however, that I can prove to you the truth of what I am saying, if you will grant me one little favour.

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ALCIBIADES

Yes, if the favour which you mean be not a troublesome one.

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SOCRATES

Will you be troubled at having questions to answer?

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ALCIBIADES

Not at all.

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SOCRATES

Then please to answer.

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ALCIBIADES

Ask me.

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SOCRATES

Have you not the intention which I attribute to you?

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ALCIBIADES

I will grant anything you like, in the hope of hearing what more you have to say.

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SOCRATES

You do, then, mean, as I was saying, to come forward in a little while in the character of an adviser of the Athenians?

And suppose that when you are ascending the bema, I pull you by the sleeve and say, Alcibiades, you are getting up to advise the Athenians—do you know the matter about which they are going to deliberate, better than they?—How would you answer?

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ALCIBIADES

I should reply, that I was going to advise them about a matter which I do know better than they.

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SOCRATES

Then you are a good adviser about the things which you know?

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ALCIBIADES

Certainly.

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SOCRATES

And do you know anything but what you have learned of others, or found out yourself?

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ALCIBIADES

That is all.

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SOCRATES

And would you have ever learned or discovered anything, if you had not been willing either to learn of others or to examine yourself?

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ALCIBIADES

I should not.

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SOCRATES

And would you have been willing to learn or to examine what you supposed that you knew?

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ALCIBIADES

Certainly not.

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SOCRATES

Then there was a time when you thought that you did not know what you are now supposed to know?

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ALCIBIADES

Certainly.

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SOCRATES

I think that I know tolerably well the extent of your acquirements; and you must tell me if I forget any of them: according to my recollection, you learned the arts of writing, of playing on the lyre, and of wrestling; the flute you never would learn; this is the sum of your accomplishments, unless there were some which you acquired in secret; and I think that secrecy was hardly possible, as you could not have come out of your door, either by day or night, without my seeing you.

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ALCIBIADES

Yes, that was the whole of my schooling.

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SOCRATES

And are you going to get up in the Athenian assembly, and give them advice about writing?

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ALCIBIADES

No, indeed.

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SOCRATES

Or about the touch of the lyre?

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ALCIBIADES

Certainly not.

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SOCRATES

And they are not in the habit of deliberating about wrestling, in the assembly?

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ALCIBIADES

Hardly.

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SOCRATES

Then what are the deliberations in which you propose to advise them?

Surely not about building?

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ALCIBIADES

No.

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SOCRATES

For the builder will advise better than you will about that?

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ALCIBIADES

He will.

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SOCRATES

Nor about divination?

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ALCIBIADES

No.

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SOCRATES

About that again the diviner will advise better than you will?

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ALCIBIADES

True.

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SOCRATES

Whether he be little or great, good or ill-looking, noble or ignoble—makes no difference.

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ALCIBIADES

Certainly not.

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SOCRATES

A man is a good adviser about anything, not because he has riches, but because he has knowledge?

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ALCIBIADES

Assuredly.

077

SOCRATES

Whether their counsellor is rich or poor, is not a matter which will make any difference to the Athenians when they are deliberating about the health of the citizens; they only require that he should be a physician.

078

ALCIBIADES

Of course.

079

SOCRATES

Then what will be the subject of deliberation about which you will be justified in getting up and advising them?

080

ALCIBIADES

About their own concerns, Socrates.

081

SOCRATES

You mean about shipbuilding, for example, when the question is what sort of ships they ought to build?

082

ALCIBIADES

No, I should not advise them about that.

083

SOCRATES

I suppose, because you do not understand shipbuilding: —is that the reason?

084

ALCIBIADES

It is.

085

SOCRATES

Then about what concerns of theirs will you advise them?

086

ALCIBIADES

About war, Socrates, or about peace, or about any other concerns of the state.

087

SOCRATES

You mean, when they deliberate with whom they ought to make peace, and with whom they ought to go to war, and in what manner?

088

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

089

SOCRATES

And they ought to go to war with those against whom it is better to go to war?

090

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

091

SOCRATES

And when it is better?

092

ALCIBIADES

Certainly.

093

SOCRATES

And for as long a time as is better?

094

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

095

SOCRATES

But suppose the Athenians to deliberate with whom they ought to close in wrestling, and whom they should grasp by the hand, would you, or the master of gymnastics, be a better adviser of them?

096

ALCIBIADES

Clearly, the master of gymnastics.

097

SOCRATES

And can you tell me on what grounds the master of gymnastics would decide, with whom they ought or ought not to close, and when and how?

To take an instance: Would he not say that they should wrestle with those against whom it is best to wrestle?

098

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

099

SOCRATES

And as much as is best?

100

ALCIBIADES

Certainly.

101

SOCRATES

And at such times as are best?

102

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

103

SOCRATES

Again; you sometimes accompany the lyre with the song and dance?

104

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

105

SOCRATES

When it is well to do so?

106

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

107

SOCRATES

And as much as is well?

108

ALCIBIADES

Just so.

109

SOCRATES

And as you speak of an excellence or art of the best in wrestling, and of an excellence in playing the lyre, I wish you would tell me what this latter is;—the excellence of wrestling I call gymnastic, and I want to know what you call the other.

110

ALCIBIADES

I do not understand you.

111

SOCRATES

Then try to do as I do; for the answer which I gave is universally right, and when I say right, I mean according to rule.

112

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

113

SOCRATES

And was not the art of which I spoke gymnastic?

114

ALCIBIADES

Certainly.

115

SOCRATES

And I called the excellence in wrestling gymnastic?

116

ALCIBIADES

You did.

117

SOCRATES

And I was right?

118

ALCIBIADES

I think that you were.

119

SOCRATES

Well, now,—for you should learn to argue prettily—let me ask you in return to tell me, first, what is that art of which playing and singing, and stepping properly in the dance, are parts,—what is the name of the whole?

I think that by this time you must be able to tell.

120

ALCIBIADES

Indeed I cannot.

121

SOCRATES

Then let me put the matter in another way: what do you call the Goddesses who are the patronesses of art?

122

ALCIBIADES

The Muses do you mean, Socrates?

123

SOCRATES

Yes, I do; and what is the name of the art which is called after them?

124

ALCIBIADES

I suppose that you mean music.

125

SOCRATES

Yes, that is my meaning; and what is the excellence of the art of music, as I told you truly that the excellence of wrestling was gymnastic—what is the excellence of music—to be what?

126

ALCIBIADES

To be musical, I suppose.

127

SOCRATES

Very good; and now please to tell me what is the excellence of war and peace; as the more musical was the more excellent, or the more gymnastical was the more excellent, tell me, what name do you give to the more excellent in war and peace?

128

ALCIBIADES

But I really cannot tell you.

129

SOCRATES

But if you were offering advice to another and said to him—This food is better than that, at this time and in this quantity, and he said to you—What do you mean, Alcibiades, by the word 'better'?

you would have no difficulty in replying that you meant 'more wholesome,' although you do not profess to be a physician: and when the subject is one of which you profess to have knowledge, and about which you are ready to get up and advise as if you knew, are you not ashamed, when you are asked, not to be able to answer the question?

Is it not disgraceful?

130

ALCIBIADES

Very.

131

SOCRATES

Well, then, consider and try to explain what is the meaning of 'better,' in the matter of making peace and going to war with those against whom you ought to go to war?

To what does the word refer?

132

ALCIBIADES

I am thinking, and I cannot tell.

133

SOCRATES

But you surely know what are the charges which we bring against one another, when we arrive at the point of making war, and what name we give them?

134

ALCIBIADES

Yes, certainly; we say that deceit or violence has been employed, or that we have been defrauded.

135

SOCRATES

And how does this happen?

Will you tell me how?

For there may be a difference in the manner.

136

ALCIBIADES

Do you mean by 'how,' Socrates, whether we suffered these things justly or unjustly?

137

SOCRATES

Exactly.

138

ALCIBIADES

There can be no greater difference than between just and unjust.

139

SOCRATES

And would you advise the Athenians to go to war with the just or with the unjust?

140

ALCIBIADES

That is an awkward question; for certainly, even if a person did intend to go to war with the just, he would not admit that they were just.

141

SOCRATES

He would not go to war, because it would be unlawful?

142

ALCIBIADES

Neither lawful nor honourable.

143

SOCRATES

Then you, too, would address them on principles of justice?

144

ALCIBIADES

Certainly.

145

SOCRATES

What, then, is justice but that better, of which I spoke, in going to war or not going to war with those against whom we ought or ought not, and when we ought or ought not to go to war?

146

ALCIBIADES

Clearly.

147

SOCRATES

But how is this, friend Alcibiades?

Have you forgotten that you do not know this, or have you been to the schoolmaster without my knowledge, and has he taught you to discern the just from the unjust?

Who is he?

I wish you would tell me, that I may go and learn of him—you shall introduce me.

148

ALCIBIADES

You are mocking, Socrates.

149

SOCRATES

No, indeed; I most solemnly declare to you by Zeus, who is the God of our common friendship, and whom I never will forswear, that I am not; tell me, then, who this instructor is, if he exists.

150

ALCIBIADES

But, perhaps, he does not exist; may I not have acquired the knowledge of just and unjust in some other way?

151

SOCRATES

Yes; if you have discovered them.

152

ALCIBIADES

But do you not think that I could discover them?

153

SOCRATES

I am sure that you might, if you enquired about them.

154

ALCIBIADES

And do you not think that I would enquire?

155

SOCRATES

Yes; if you thought that you did not know them.

156

ALCIBIADES

And was there not a time when I did so think?

157

SOCRATES

Very good; and can you tell me how long it is since you thought that you did not know the nature of the just and the unjust?

What do you say to a year ago?

Were you then in a state of conscious ignorance and enquiry?

Or did you think that you knew?

And please to answer truly, that our discussion may not be in vain.

158

ALCIBIADES

Well, I thought that I knew.

159

SOCRATES

And two years ago, and three years ago, and four years ago, you knew all the same?

160

ALCIBIADES

I did.

161

SOCRATES

And more than four years ago you were a child—were you not?

162

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

163

SOCRATES

And then I am quite sure that you thought you knew.

164

ALCIBIADES

Why are you so sure?

165

SOCRATES

Because I often heard you when a child, in your teacher's house, or elsewhere, playing at dice or some other game with the boys, not hesitating at all about the nature of the just and unjust; but very confident—crying and shouting that one of the boys was a rogue and a cheat, and had been cheating.

Is it not true?

166

ALCIBIADES

But what was I to do, Socrates, when anybody cheated me?

167

SOCRATES

And how can you say, 'What was I to do'?

if at the time you did not know whether you were wronged or not?

168

ALCIBIADES

To be sure I knew; I was quite aware that I was being cheated.

169

SOCRATES

Then you suppose yourself even when a child to have known the nature of just and unjust?

170

ALCIBIADES

Certainly; and I did know then.

171

SOCRATES

And when did you discover them—not, surely, at the time when you thought that you knew them?

172

ALCIBIADES

Certainly not.

173

SOCRATES

And when did you think that you were ignorant—if you consider, you will find that there never was such a time?

174

ALCIBIADES

Really, Socrates, I cannot say.

175

SOCRATES

Then you did not learn them by discovering them?

176

ALCIBIADES

Clearly not.

177

SOCRATES

But just before you said that you did not know them by learning; now, if you have neither discovered nor learned them, how and whence do you come to know them?

178

ALCIBIADES

I suppose that I was mistaken in saying that I knew them through my own discovery of them; whereas, in truth, I learned them in the same way that other people learn.

179

SOCRATES

So you said before, and I must again ask, of whom?

Do tell me.

180

ALCIBIADES

Of the many.

181

SOCRATES

Do you take refuge in them?

I cannot say much for your teachers.

182

ALCIBIADES

Why, are they not able to teach?

183

SOCRATES

They could not teach you how to play at draughts, which you would acknowledge (would you not) to be a much smaller matter than justice?

184

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

185

SOCRATES

And can they teach the better who are unable to teach the worse?

186

ALCIBIADES

I think that they can; at any rate, they can teach many far better things than to play at draughts.

187

SOCRATES

What things?

188

ALCIBIADES

Why, for example, I learned to speak Greek of them, and I cannot say who was my teacher, or to whom I am to attribute my knowledge of Greek, if not to those good-for-nothing teachers, as you call them.

189

SOCRATES

Why, yes, my friend; and the many are good enough teachers of Greek, and some of their instructions in that line may be justly praised.

190

ALCIBIADES

Why is that?

191

SOCRATES

Why, because they have the qualities which good teachers ought to have.

192

ALCIBIADES

What qualities?

193

SOCRATES

Why, you know that knowledge is the first qualification of any teacher?

194

ALCIBIADES

Certainly.

195

SOCRATES

And if they know, they must agree together and not differ?

196

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

197

SOCRATES

And would you say that they knew the things about which they differ?

198

ALCIBIADES

No.

199

SOCRATES

Then how can they teach them?

200

ALCIBIADES

They cannot.

201

SOCRATES

Well, but do you imagine that the many would differ about the nature of wood and stone?

are they not agreed if you ask them what they are?

and do they not run to fetch the same thing, when they want a piece of wood or a stone?

And so in similar cases, which I suspect to be pretty nearly all that you mean by speaking Greek.

202

ALCIBIADES

True.

203

SOCRATES

These, as we were saying, are matters about which they are agreed with one another and with themselves; both individuals and states use the same words about them; they do not use some one word and some another.

204

ALCIBIADES

They do not.

205

SOCRATES

Then they may be expected to be good teachers of these things?

206

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

207

SOCRATES

And if we want to instruct any one in them, we shall be right in sending him to be taught by our friends the many?

208

ALCIBIADES

Very true.

209

SOCRATES

But if we wanted further to know not only which are men and which are horses, but which men or horses have powers of running, would the many still be able to inform us?

210

ALCIBIADES

Certainly not.

211

SOCRATES

And you have a sufficient proof that they do not know these things and are not the best teachers of them, inasmuch as they are never agreed about them?

212

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

213

SOCRATES

And suppose that we wanted to know not only what men are like, but what healthy or diseased men are like—would the many be able to teach us?

214

ALCIBIADES

They would not.

215

SOCRATES

And you would have a proof that they were bad teachers of these matters, if you saw them at variance?

216

ALCIBIADES

I should.

217

SOCRATES

Well, but are the many agreed with themselves, or with one another, about the justice or injustice of men and things?

218

ALCIBIADES

Assuredly not, Socrates.

219

SOCRATES

There is no subject about which they are more at variance?

220

ALCIBIADES

None.

221

SOCRATES

I do not suppose that you ever saw or heard of men quarrelling over the principles of health and disease to such an extent as to go to war and kill one another for the sake of them?

222

ALCIBIADES

No indeed.

223

SOCRATES

But of the quarrels about justice and injustice, even if you have never seen them, you have certainly heard from many people, including Homer; for you have heard of the Iliad and Odyssey?

224

ALCIBIADES

To be sure, Socrates.

225

SOCRATES

A difference of just and unjust is the argument of those poems?

226

ALCIBIADES

True.

227

SOCRATES

Which difference caused all the wars and deaths of Trojans and Achaeans, and the deaths of the suitors of Penelope in their quarrel with Odysseus.

228

ALCIBIADES

Very true.

229

SOCRATES

And when the Athenians and Lacedaemonians and Boeotians fell at Tanagra, and afterwards in the battle of Coronea, at which your father Cleinias met his end, the question was one of justice—this was the sole cause of the battles, and of their deaths.

230

ALCIBIADES

Very true.

231

SOCRATES

But can they be said to understand that about which they are quarrelling to the death?

232

ALCIBIADES

Clearly not.

233

SOCRATES

And yet those whom you thus allow to be ignorant are the teachers to whom you are appealing.

234

ALCIBIADES

Very true.

235

SOCRATES

But how are you ever likely to know the nature of justice and injustice, about which you are so perplexed, if you have neither learned them of others nor discovered them yourself?

236

ALCIBIADES

From what you say, I suppose not.

237

SOCRATES

See, again, how inaccurately you speak, Alcibiades!

238

ALCIBIADES

In what respect?

239

SOCRATES

In saying that I say so.

240

ALCIBIADES

Why, did you not say that I know nothing of the just and unjust?

241

SOCRATES

No; I did not.

242

ALCIBIADES

Did I, then?

243

SOCRATES

Yes.

244

ALCIBIADES

How was that?

245

SOCRATES

Let me explain.

Suppose I were to ask you which is the greater number, two or one; you would reply 'two'?

246

ALCIBIADES

I should.

247

SOCRATES

And by how much greater?

248

ALCIBIADES

By one.

249

SOCRATES

Which of us now says that two is more than one?

250

ALCIBIADES

I do.

251

SOCRATES

Did not I ask, and you answer the question?

252

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

253

SOCRATES

Then who is speaking?

I who put the question, or you who answer me?

254

ALCIBIADES

I am.

255

SOCRATES

Or suppose that I ask and you tell me the letters which make up the name Socrates, which of us is the speaker?

256

ALCIBIADES

I am.

257

SOCRATES

Now let us put the case generally: whenever there is a question and answer, who is the speaker,—the questioner or the answerer?

258

ALCIBIADES

I should say, Socrates, that the answerer was the speaker.

259

SOCRATES

And have I not been the questioner all through?

260

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

261

SOCRATES

And you the answerer?

262

ALCIBIADES

Just so.

263

SOCRATES

Which of us, then, was the speaker?

264

ALCIBIADES

The inference is, Socrates, that I was the speaker.

265

SOCRATES

Did not some one say that Alcibiades, the fair son of Cleinias, not understanding about just and unjust, but thinking that he did understand, was going to the assembly to advise the Athenians about what he did not know?

Was not that said?

266

ALCIBIADES

Very true.

267

SOCRATES

Then, Alcibiades, the result may be expressed in the language of Euripides.

I think that you have heard all this 'from yourself, and not from me'; nor did I say this, which you erroneously attribute to me, but you yourself, and what you said was very true.

For indeed, my dear fellow, the design which you meditate of teaching what you do not know, and have not taken any pains to learn, is downright insanity.

268

ALCIBIADES

But, Socrates, I think that the Athenians and the rest of the Hellenes do not often advise as to the more just or unjust; for they see no difficulty in them, and therefore they leave them, and consider which course of action will be most expedient; for there is a difference between justice and expediency.

Many persons have done great wrong and profited by their injustice; others have done rightly and come to no good.

269

SOCRATES

Well, but granting that the just and the expedient are ever so much opposed, you surely do not imagine that you know what is expedient for mankind, or why a thing is expedient?

270

ALCIBIADES

Why not, Socrates?—But I am not going to be asked again from whom I learned, or when I made the discovery.

271

SOCRATES

What a way you have!

When you make a mistake which might be refuted by a previous argument, you insist on having a new and different refutation; the old argument is a worn-our garment which you will no longer put on, but some one must produce another which is clean and new.

Now I shall disregard this move of yours, and shall ask over again,—Where did you learn and how do you know the nature of the expedient, and who is your teacher?

All this I comprehend in a single question, and now you will manifestly be in the old difficulty, and will not be able to show that you know the expedient, either because you learned or because you discovered it yourself.

But, as I perceive that you are dainty, and dislike the taste of a stale argument, I will enquire no further into your knowledge of what is expedient or what is not expedient for the Athenian people, and simply request you to say why you do not explain whether justice and expediency are the same or different?

And if you like you may examine me as I have examined you, or, if you would rather, you may carry on the discussion by yourself.

272

ALCIBIADES

But I am not certain, Socrates, whether I shall be able to discuss the matter with you.

273

SOCRATES

Then imagine, my dear fellow, that I am the demus and the ecclesia; for in the ecclesia, too, you will have to persuade men individually.

274

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

275

SOCRATES

And is not the same person able to persuade one individual singly and many individuals of the things which he knows?

The grammarian, for example, can persuade one and he can persuade many about letters.

276

ALCIBIADES

True.

277

SOCRATES

And about number, will not the same person persuade one and persuade many?

278

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

279

SOCRATES

And this will be he who knows number, or the arithmetician?

280

ALCIBIADES

Quite true.

281

SOCRATES

And cannot you persuade one man about that of which you can persuade many?

282

ALCIBIADES

I suppose so.

283

SOCRATES

And that of which you can persuade either is clearly what you know?

284

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

285

SOCRATES

And the only difference between one who argues as we are doing, and the orator who is addressing an assembly, is that the one seeks to persuade a number, and the other an individual, of the same things.

286

ALCIBIADES

I suppose so.

287

SOCRATES

Well, then, since the same person who can persuade a multitude can persuade individuals, try conclusions upon me, and prove to me that the just is not always expedient.

288

ALCIBIADES

You take liberties, Socrates.

289

SOCRATES

I shall take the liberty of proving to you the opposite of that which you will not prove to me.

290

ALCIBIADES

Proceed.

291

SOCRATES

Answer my questions—that is all.

292

ALCIBIADES

Nay, I should like you to be the speaker.

293

SOCRATES

What, do you not wish to be persuaded?

294

ALCIBIADES

Certainly I do.

295

SOCRATES

And can you be persuaded better than out of your own mouth?

296

ALCIBIADES

I think not.

297

SOCRATES

Then you shall answer; and if you do not hear the words, that the just is the expedient, coming from your own lips, never believe another man again.

298

ALCIBIADES

I won't; but answer I will, for I do not see how I can come to any harm.

299

SOCRATES

A true prophecy!

Let me begin then by enquiring of you whether you allow that the just is sometimes expedient and sometimes not?

300

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

301

SOCRATES

And sometimes honourable and sometimes not?

302

ALCIBIADES

What do you mean?

303

SOCRATES

I am asking if you ever knew any one who did what was dishonourable and yet just?

304

ALCIBIADES

Never.

305

SOCRATES

All just things are honourable?

306

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

307

SOCRATES

And are honourable things sometimes good and sometimes not good, or are they always good?

308

ALCIBIADES

I rather think, Socrates, that some honourable things are evil.

309

SOCRATES

And are some dishonourable things good?

310

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

311

SOCRATES

You mean in such a case as the following: —In time of war, men have been wounded or have died in rescuing a companion or kinsman, when others who have neglected the duty of rescuing them have escaped in safety?

312

ALCIBIADES

True.

313

SOCRATES

And to rescue another under such circumstances is honourable, in respect of the attempt to save those whom we ought to save; and this is courage?

314

ALCIBIADES

True.

315

SOCRATES

But evil in respect of death and wounds?

316

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

317

SOCRATES

And the courage which is shown in the rescue is one thing, and the death another?

318

ALCIBIADES

Certainly.

319

SOCRATES

Then the rescue of one's friends is honourable in one point of view, but evil in another?

320

ALCIBIADES

True.

321

SOCRATES

And if honourable, then also good: Will you consider now whether I may not be right, for you were acknowledging that the courage which is shown in the rescue is honourable?

Now is this courage good or evil?

Look at the matter thus: which would you rather choose, good or evil?

322

ALCIBIADES

Good.

323

SOCRATES

And the greatest goods you would be most ready to choose, and would least like to be deprived of them?

324

ALCIBIADES

Certainly.

325

SOCRATES

What would you say of courage?

At what price would you be willing to be deprived of courage?

326

ALCIBIADES

I would rather die than be a coward.

327

SOCRATES

Then you think that cowardice is the worst of evils?

328

ALCIBIADES

I do.

329

SOCRATES

As bad as death, I suppose?

330

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

331

SOCRATES

And life and courage are the extreme opposites of death and cowardice?

332

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

333

SOCRATES

And they are what you would most desire to have, and their opposites you would least desire?

334

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

335

SOCRATES

Is this because you think life and courage the best, and death and cowardice the worst?

336

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

337

SOCRATES

And you would term the rescue of a friend in battle honourable, in as much as courage does a good work?

338

ALCIBIADES

I should.

339

SOCRATES

But evil because of the death which ensues?

340

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

341

SOCRATES

Might we not describe their different effects as follows: —You may call either of them evil in respect of the evil which is the result, and good in respect of the good which is the result of either of them?

342

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

343

SOCRATES

And they are honourable in so far as they are good, and dishonourable in so far as they are evil?

344

ALCIBIADES

True.

345

SOCRATES

Then when you say that the rescue of a friend in battle is honourable and yet evil, that is equivalent to saying that the rescue is good and yet evil?

346

ALCIBIADES

I believe that you are right, Socrates.

347

SOCRATES

Nothing honourable, regarded as honourable, is evil; nor anything base, regarded as base, good.

348

ALCIBIADES

Clearly not.

349

SOCRATES

Look at the matter yet once more in a further light: he who acts honourably acts well?

350

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

351

SOCRATES

And he who acts well is happy?

352

ALCIBIADES

Of course.

353

SOCRATES

And the happy are those who obtain good?

354

ALCIBIADES

True.

355

SOCRATES

And they obtain good by acting well and honourably?

356

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

357

SOCRATES

Then acting well is a good?

358

ALCIBIADES

Certainly.

359

SOCRATES

And happiness is a good?

360

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

361

SOCRATES

Then the good and the honourable are again identified.

362

ALCIBIADES

Manifestly.

363

SOCRATES

Then, if the argument holds, what we find to be honourable we shall also find to be good?

364

ALCIBIADES

Certainly.

365

SOCRATES

And is the good expedient or not?

366

ALCIBIADES

Expedient.

367

SOCRATES

Do you remember our admissions about the just?

368

ALCIBIADES

Yes; if I am not mistaken, we said that those who acted justly must also act honourably.

369

SOCRATES

And the honourable is the good?

370

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

371

SOCRATES

And the good is expedient?

372

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

373

SOCRATES

Then, Alcibiades, the just is expedient?

374

ALCIBIADES

I should infer so.

375

SOCRATES

And all this I prove out of your own mouth, for I ask and you answer?

376

ALCIBIADES

I must acknowledge it to be true.

377

SOCRATES

And having acknowledged that the just is the same as the expedient, are you not (let me ask) prepared to ridicule any one who, pretending to understand the principles of justice and injustice, gets up to advise the noble Athenians or the ignoble Peparethians, that the just may be the evil?

378

ALCIBIADES

I solemnly declare, Socrates, that I do not know what I am saying.

Verily, I am in a strange state, for when you put questions to me I am of different minds in successive instants.

379

SOCRATES

And are you not aware of the nature of this perplexity, my friend?

380

ALCIBIADES

Indeed I am not.

381

SOCRATES

Do you suppose that if some one were to ask you whether you have two eyes or three, or two hands or four, or anything of that sort, you would then be of different minds in successive instants?

382

ALCIBIADES

I begin to distrust myself, but still I do not suppose that I should.

383

SOCRATES

You would feel no doubt; and for this reason—because you would know?

384

ALCIBIADES

I suppose so.

385

SOCRATES

And the reason why you involuntarily contradict yourself is clearly that you are ignorant?

386

ALCIBIADES

Very likely.

387

SOCRATES

And if you are perplexed in answering about just and unjust, honourable and dishonourable, good and evil, expedient and inexpedient, the reason is that you are ignorant of them, and therefore in perplexity.

Is not that clear?

388

ALCIBIADES

I agree.

389

SOCRATES

But is this always the case, and is a man necessarily perplexed about that of which he has no knowledge?

390

ALCIBIADES

Certainly he is.

391

SOCRATES

And do you know how to ascend into heaven?

392

ALCIBIADES

Certainly not.

393

SOCRATES

And in this case, too, is your judgment perplexed?

394

ALCIBIADES

No.

395

SOCRATES

Do you see the reason why, or shall I tell you?

396

ALCIBIADES

Tell me.

397

SOCRATES

The reason is, that you not only do not know, my friend, but you do not think that you know.

398

ALCIBIADES

There again; what do you mean?

399

SOCRATES

Ask yourself; are you in any perplexity about things of which you are ignorant?

You know, for example, that you know nothing about the preparation of food.

400

ALCIBIADES

Very true.

401

SOCRATES

And do you think and perplex yourself about the preparation of food: or do you leave that to some one who understands the art?

402

ALCIBIADES

The latter.

403

SOCRATES

Or if you were on a voyage, would you bewilder yourself by considering whether the rudder is to be drawn inwards or outwards, or do you leave that to the pilot, and do nothing?

404

ALCIBIADES

It would be the concern of the pilot.

405

SOCRATES

Then you are not perplexed about what you do not know, if you know that you do not know it?

406

ALCIBIADES

I imagine not.

407

SOCRATES

Do you not see, then, that mistakes in life and practice are likewise to be attributed to the ignorance which has conceit of knowledge?

408

ALCIBIADES

Once more, what do you mean?

409

SOCRATES

I suppose that we begin to act when we think that we know what we are doing?

410

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

411

SOCRATES

But when people think that they do not know, they entrust their business to others?

412

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

413

SOCRATES

And so there is a class of ignorant persons who do not make mistakes in life, because they trust others about things of which they are ignorant?

414

ALCIBIADES

True.

415

SOCRATES

Who, then, are the persons who make mistakes?

They cannot, of course, be those who know?

416

ALCIBIADES

Certainly not.

417

SOCRATES

But if neither those who know, nor those who know that they do not know, make mistakes, there remain those only who do not know and think that they know.

418

ALCIBIADES

Yes, only those.

419

SOCRATES

Then this is ignorance of the disgraceful sort which is mischievous?

420

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

421

SOCRATES

And most mischievous and most disgraceful when having to do with the greatest matters?

422

ALCIBIADES

By far.

423

SOCRATES

And can there be any matters greater than the just, the honourable, the good, and the expedient?

424

ALCIBIADES

There cannot be.

425

SOCRATES

And these, as you were saying, are what perplex you?

426

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

427

SOCRATES

But if you are perplexed, then, as the previous argument has shown, you are not only ignorant of the greatest matters, but being ignorant you fancy that you know them?

428

ALCIBIADES

I fear that you are right.

429

SOCRATES

And now see what has happened to you, Alcibiades!

I hardly like to speak of your evil case, but as we are alone I will: My good friend, you are wedded to ignorance of the most disgraceful kind, and of this you are convicted, not by me, but out of your own mouth and by your own argument; wherefore also you rush into politics before you are educated.

Neither is your case to be deemed singular.

For I might say the same of almost all our statesmen, with the exception, perhaps of your guardian, Pericles.

430

ALCIBIADES

Yes, Socrates; and Pericles is said not to have got his wisdom by the light of nature, but to have associated with several of the philosophers; with Pythocleides, for example, and with Anaxagoras, and now in advanced life with Damon, in the hope of gaining wisdom.

431

SOCRATES

Very good; but did you ever know a man wise in anything who was unable to impart his particular wisdom?

For example, he who taught you letters was not only wise, but he made you and any others whom he liked wise.

432

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

433

SOCRATES

And you, whom he taught, can do the same?

434

ALCIBIADES

True.

435

SOCRATES

And in like manner the harper and gymnastic-master?

436

ALCIBIADES

Certainly.

437

SOCRATES

When a person is enabled to impart knowledge to another, he thereby gives an excellent proof of his own understanding of any matter.

438

ALCIBIADES

I agree.

439

SOCRATES

Well, and did Pericles make any one wise; did he begin by making his sons wise?

440

ALCIBIADES

But, Socrates, if the two sons of Pericles were simpletons, what has that to do with the matter?

441

SOCRATES

Well, but did he make your brother, Cleinias, wise?

442

ALCIBIADES

Cleinias is a madman; there is no use in talking of him.

443

SOCRATES

But if Cleinias is a madman and the two sons of Pericles were simpletons, what reason can be given why he neglects you, and lets you be as you are?

444

ALCIBIADES

I believe that I am to blame for not listening to him.

445

SOCRATES

But did you ever hear of any other Athenian or foreigner, bond or free, who was deemed to have grown wiser in the society of Pericles,—as I might cite Pythodorus, the son of Isolochus, and Callias, the son of Calliades, who have grown wiser in the society of Zeno, for which privilege they have each of them paid him the sum of a hundred minae (about 406 pounds sterling) to the increase of their wisdom and fame.

446

ALCIBIADES

I certainly never did hear of any one.

447

SOCRATES

Well, and in reference to your own case, do you mean to remain as you are, or will you take some pains about yourself?

448

ALCIBIADES

With your aid, Socrates, I will.

And indeed, when I hear you speak, the truth of what you are saying strikes home to me, and I agree with you, for our statesmen, all but a few, do appear to be quite uneducated.

449

SOCRATES

What is the inference?

450

ALCIBIADES

Why, that if they were educated they would be trained athletes, and he who means to rival them ought to have knowledge and experience when he attacks them; but now, as they have become politicians without any special training, why should I have the trouble of learning and practising?

For I know well that by the light of nature I shall get the better of them.

451

SOCRATES

My dear friend, what a sentiment!

And how unworthy of your noble form and your high estate!

452

ALCIBIADES

What do you mean, Socrates; why do you say so?

453

SOCRATES

I am grieved when I think of our mutual love.

454

ALCIBIADES

At what?

455

SOCRATES

At your fancying that the contest on which you are entering is with people here.

456

ALCIBIADES

Why, what others are there?

457

SOCRATES

Is that a question which a magnanimous soul should ask?

458

ALCIBIADES

Do you mean to say that the contest is not with these?

459

SOCRATES

And suppose that you were going to steer a ship into action, would you only aim at being the best pilot on board?

Would you not, while acknowledging that you must possess this degree of excellence, rather look to your antagonists, and not, as you are now doing, to your fellow combatants?

You ought to be so far above these latter, that they will not even dare to be your rivals; and, being regarded by you as inferiors, will do battle for you against the enemy; this is the kind of superiority which you must establish over them, if you mean to accomplish any noble action really worthy of yourself and of the state.

460

ALCIBIADES

That would certainly be my aim.

461

SOCRATES

Verily, then, you have good reason to be satisfied, if you are better than the soldiers; and you need not, when you are their superior and have your thoughts and actions fixed upon them, look away to the generals of the enemy.

462

ALCIBIADES

Of whom are you speaking, Socrates?

463

SOCRATES

Why, you surely know that our city goes to war now and then with the Lacedaemonians and with the great king?

464

ALCIBIADES

True enough.

465

SOCRATES

And if you meant to be the ruler of this city, would you not be right in considering that the Lacedaemonian and Persian king were your true rivals?

466

ALCIBIADES

I believe that you are right.

467

SOCRATES

Oh no, my friend, I am quite wrong, and I think that you ought rather to turn your attention to Midias the quail-breeder and others like him, who manage our politics; in whom, as the women would remark, you may still see the slaves' cut of hair, cropping out in their minds as well as on their pates; and they come with their barbarous lingo to flatter us and not to rule us.

To these, I say, you should look, and then you need not trouble yourself about your own fitness to contend in such a noble arena: there is no reason why you should either learn what has to be learned, or practise what has to be practised, and only when thoroughly prepared enter on a political career.

468

ALCIBIADES

There, I think, Socrates, that you are right; I do not suppose, however, that the Spartan generals or the great king are really different from anybody else.

469

SOCRATES

But, my dear friend, do consider what you are saying.

470

ALCIBIADES

What am I to consider?

471

SOCRATES

In the first place, will you be more likely to take care of yourself, if you are in a wholesome fear and dread of them, or if you are not?

472

ALCIBIADES

Clearly, if I have such a fear of them.

473

SOCRATES

And do you think that you will sustain any injury if you take care of yourself?

474

ALCIBIADES

No, I shall be greatly benefited.

475

SOCRATES

And this is one very important respect in which that notion of yours is bad.

476

ALCIBIADES

True.

477

SOCRATES

In the next place, consider that what you say is probably false.

478

ALCIBIADES

How so?

479

SOCRATES

Let me ask you whether better natures are likely to be found in noble races or not in noble races?

480

ALCIBIADES

Clearly in noble races.

481

SOCRATES

Are not those who are well born and well bred most likely to be perfect in virtue?

482

ALCIBIADES

Certainly.

483

SOCRATES

Then let us compare our antecedents with those of the Lacedaemonian and Persian kings; are they inferior to us in descent?

Have we not heard that the former are sprung from Heracles, and the latter from Achaemenes, and that the race of Heracles and the race of Achaemenes go back to Perseus, son of Zeus?

484

ALCIBIADES

Why, so does mine go back to Eurysaces, and he to Zeus!

485

SOCRATES

And mine, noble Alcibiades, to Daedalus, and he to Hephaestus, son of Zeus.

But, for all that, we are far inferior to them.

For they are descended 'from Zeus,' through a line of kings—either kings of Argos and Lacedaemon, or kings of Persia, a country which the descendants of Achaemenes have always possessed, besides being at various times sovereigns of Asia, as they now are; whereas, we and our fathers were but private persons.

How ridiculous would you be thought if you were to make a display of your ancestors and of Salamis the island of Eurysaces, or of Aegina, the habitation of the still more ancient Aeacus, before Artaxerxes, son of Xerxes.

You should consider how inferior we are to them both in the derivation of our birth and in other particulars.

Did you never observe how great is the property of the Spartan kings?

And their wives are under the guardianship of the Ephori, who are public officers and watch over them, in order to preserve as far as possible the purity of the Heracleid blood.

Still greater is the difference among the Persians; for no one entertains a suspicion that the father of a prince of Persia can be any one but the king.

Such is the awe which invests the person of the queen, that any other guard is needless.

And when the heir of the kingdom is born, all the subjects of the king feast; and the day of his birth is for ever afterwards kept as a holiday and time of sacrifice by all Asia; whereas, when you and I were born, Alcibiades, as the comic poet says, the neighbours hardly knew of the important event.

After the birth of the royal child, he is tended, not by a good-for-nothing woman-nurse, but by the best of the royal eunuchs, who are charged with the care of him, and especially with the fashioning and right formation of his limbs, in order that he may be as shapely as possible; which being their calling, they are held in great honour.

And when the young prince is seven years old he is put upon a horse and taken to the riding-masters, and begins to go out hunting.

And at fourteen years of age he is handed over to the royal schoolmasters, as they are termed: these are four chosen men, reputed to be the best among the Persians of a certain age; and one of them is the wisest, another the justest, a third the most temperate, and a fourth the most valiant.

The first instructs him in the magianism of Zoroaster, the son of Oromasus, which is the worship of the Gods, and teaches him also the duties of his royal office; the second, who is the justest, teaches him always to speak the truth; the third, or most temperate, forbids him to allow any pleasure to be lord over him, that he may be accustomed to be a freeman and king indeed,—lord of himself first, and not a slave; the most valiant trains him to be bold and fearless, telling him that if he fears he is to deem himself a slave; whereas Pericles gave you, Alcibiades, for a tutor Zopyrus the Thracian, a slave of his who was past all other work.

I might enlarge on the nurture and education of your rivals, but that would be tedious; and what I have said is a sufficient sample of what remains to be said.

I have only to remark, by way of contrast, that no one cares about your birth or nurture or education, or, I may say, about that of any other Athenian, unless he has a lover who looks after him.

And if you cast an eye on the wealth, the luxury, the garments with their flowing trains, the anointings with myrrh, the multitudes of attendants, and all the other bravery of the Persians, you will be ashamed when you discern your own inferiority; or if you look at the temperance and orderliness and ease and grace and magnanimity and courage and endurance and love of toil and desire of glory and ambition of the Lacedaemonians—in all these respects you will see that you are but a child in comparison of them.

Even in the matter of wealth, if you value yourself upon that, I must reveal to you how you stand; for if you form an estimate of the wealth of the Lacedaemonians, you will see that our possessions fall far short of theirs.

For no one here can compete with them either in the extent and fertility of their own and the Messenian territory, or in the number of their slaves, and especially of the Helots, or of their horses, or of the animals which feed on the Messenian pastures.

But I have said enough of this: and as to gold and silver, there is more of them in Lacedaemon than in all the rest of Hellas, for during many generations gold has been always flowing in to them from the whole Hellenic world, and often from the barbarian also, and never going out, as in the fable of Aesop the fox said to the lion, 'The prints of the feet of those going in are distinct enough;' but who ever saw the trace of money going out of Lacedaemon?

And therefore you may safely infer that the inhabitants are the richest of the Hellenes in gold and silver, and that their kings are the richest of them, for they have a larger share of these things, and they have also a tribute paid to them which is very considerable.

Yet the Spartan wealth, though great in comparison of the wealth of the other Hellenes, is as nothing in comparison of that of the Persians and their kings.

Why, I have been informed by a credible person who went up to the king (at Susa), that he passed through a large tract of excellent land, extending for nearly a day's journey, which the people of the country called the queen's girdle, and another, which they called her veil; and several other fair and fertile districts, which were reserved for the adornment of the queen, and are named after her several habiliments.

Now, I cannot help thinking to myself, What if some one were to go to Amestris, the wife of Xerxes and mother of Artaxerxes, and say to her, There is a certain Dinomache, whose whole wardrobe is not worth fifty minae—and that will be more than the value—and she has a son who is possessed of a three-hundred acre patch at Erchiae, and he has a mind to go to war with your son—would she not wonder to what this Alcibiades trusts for success in the conflict?

'He must rely,' she would say to herself, 'upon his training and wisdom—these are the things which Hellenes value.'

And if she heard that this Alcibiades who is making the attempt is not as yet twenty years old, and is wholly uneducated, and when his lover tells him that he ought to get education and training first, and then go and fight the king, he refuses, and says that he is well enough as he is, would she not be amazed, and ask 'On what, then, does the youth rely?'

And if we replied: He relies on his beauty, and stature, and birth, and mental endowments, she would think that we were mad, Alcibiades, when she compared the advantages which you possess with those of her own people.

And I believe that even Lampido, the daughter of Leotychides, the wife of Archidamus and mother of Agis, all of whom were kings, would have the same feeling; if, in your present uneducated state, you were to turn your thoughts against her son, she too would be equally astonished.

But how disgraceful, that we should not have as high a notion of what is required in us as our enemies' wives and mothers have of the qualities which are required in their assailants!

O my friend, be persuaded by me, and hear the Delphian inscription, 'Know thyself'—not the men whom you think, but these kings are our rivals, and we can only overcome them by pains and skill.

And if you fail in the required qualities, you will fail also in becoming renowned among Hellenes and Barbarians, which you seem to desire more than any other man ever desired anything.

486

ALCIBIADES

I entirely believe you; but what are the sort of pains which are required, Socrates,—can you tell me?

487

SOCRATES

Yes, I can; but we must take counsel together concerning the manner in which both of us may be most improved.

For what I am telling you of the necessity of education applies to myself as well as to you; and there is only one point in which I have an advantage over you.

488

ALCIBIADES

What is that?

489

SOCRATES

I have a guardian who is better and wiser than your guardian, Pericles.

490

ALCIBIADES

Who is he, Socrates?

491

SOCRATES

God, Alcibiades, who up to this day has not allowed me to converse with you; and he inspires in me the faith that I am especially designed to bring you to honour.

492

ALCIBIADES

You are jesting, Socrates.

493

SOCRATES

Perhaps, at any rate, I am right in saying that all men greatly need pains and care, and you and I above all men.

494

ALCIBIADES

You are not far wrong about me.

495

SOCRATES

And certainly not about myself.

496

ALCIBIADES

But what can we do?

497

SOCRATES

There must be no hesitation or cowardice, my friend.

498

ALCIBIADES

That would not become us, Socrates.

499

SOCRATES

No, indeed, and we ought to take counsel together: for do we not wish to be as good as possible?

500

ALCIBIADES

We do.

501

SOCRATES

In what sort of virtue?

502

ALCIBIADES

Plainly, in the virtue of good men.

503

SOCRATES

Who are good in what?

504

ALCIBIADES

Those, clearly, who are good in the management of affairs.

505

SOCRATES

What sort of affairs?

Equestrian affairs?

506

ALCIBIADES

Certainly not.

507

SOCRATES

You mean that about them we should have recourse to horsemen?

508

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

509

SOCRATES

Well, naval affairs?

510

ALCIBIADES

No.

511

SOCRATES

You mean that we should have recourse to sailors about them?

512

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

513

SOCRATES

Then what affairs?

And who do them?

514

ALCIBIADES

The affairs which occupy Athenian gentlemen.

515

SOCRATES

And when you speak of gentlemen, do you mean the wise or the unwise?

516

ALCIBIADES

The wise.

517

SOCRATES

And a man is good in respect of that in which he is wise?

518

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

519

SOCRATES

And evil in respect of that in which he is unwise?

520

ALCIBIADES

Certainly.

521

SOCRATES

The shoemaker, for example, is wise in respect of the making of shoes?

522

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

523

SOCRATES

Then he is good in that?

524

ALCIBIADES

He is.

525

SOCRATES

But in respect of the making of garments he is unwise?

526

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

527

SOCRATES

Then in that he is bad?

528

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

529

SOCRATES

Then upon this view of the matter the same man is good and also bad?

530

ALCIBIADES

True.

531

SOCRATES

But would you say that the good are the same as the bad?

532

ALCIBIADES

Certainly not.

533

SOCRATES

Then whom do you call the good?

534

ALCIBIADES

I mean by the good those who are able to rule in the city.

535

SOCRATES

Not, surely, over horses?

536

ALCIBIADES

Certainly not.

537

SOCRATES

But over men?

538

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

539

SOCRATES

When they are sick?

540

ALCIBIADES

No.

541

SOCRATES

Or on a voyage?

542

ALCIBIADES

No.

543

SOCRATES

Or reaping the harvest?

544

ALCIBIADES

No.

545

SOCRATES

When they are doing something or nothing?

546

ALCIBIADES

When they are doing something, I should say.

547

SOCRATES

I wish that you would explain to me what this something is.

548

ALCIBIADES

When they are having dealings with one another, and using one another's services, as we citizens do in our daily life.

549

SOCRATES

Those of whom you speak are ruling over men who are using the services of other men?

550

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

551

SOCRATES

Are they ruling over the signal-men who give the time to the rowers?

552

ALCIBIADES

No; they are not.

553

SOCRATES

That would be the office of the pilot?

554

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

555

SOCRATES

But, perhaps you mean that they rule over flute-players, who lead the singers and use the services of the dancers?

556

ALCIBIADES

Certainly not.

557

SOCRATES

That would be the business of the teacher of the chorus?

558

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

559

SOCRATES

Then what is the meaning of being able to rule over men who use other men?

560

ALCIBIADES

I mean that they rule over men who have common rights of citizenship, and dealings with one another.

561

SOCRATES

And what sort of an art is this?

Suppose that I ask you again, as I did just now, What art makes men know how to rule over their fellow-sailors,—how would you answer?

562

ALCIBIADES

The art of the pilot.

563

SOCRATES

And, if I may recur to another old instance, what art enables them to rule over their fellow-singers?

564

ALCIBIADES

The art of the teacher of the chorus, which you were just now mentioning.

565

SOCRATES

And what do you call the art of fellow-citizens?

566

ALCIBIADES

I should say, good counsel, Socrates.

567

SOCRATES

And is the art of the pilot evil counsel?

568

ALCIBIADES

No.

569

SOCRATES

But good counsel?

570

ALCIBIADES

Yes, that is what I should say,—good counsel, of which the aim is the preservation of the voyagers.

571

SOCRATES

True.

And what is the aim of that other good counsel of which you speak?

572

ALCIBIADES

The aim is the better order and preservation of the city.

573

SOCRATES

And what is that of which the absence or presence improves and preserves the order of the city?

Suppose you were to ask me, what is that of which the presence or absence improves or preserves the order of the body?

I should reply, the presence of health and the absence of disease.

You would say the same?

574

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

575

SOCRATES

And if you were to ask me the same question about the eyes, I should reply in the same way, 'the presence of sight and the absence of blindness;' or about the ears, I should reply, that they were improved and were in better case, when deafness was absent, and hearing was present in them.

576

ALCIBIADES

True.

577

SOCRATES

And what would you say of a state?

What is that by the presence or absence of which the state is improved and better managed and ordered?

578

ALCIBIADES

I should say, Socrates: —the presence of friendship and the absence of hatred and division.

579

SOCRATES

And do you mean by friendship agreement or disagreement?

580

ALCIBIADES

Agreement.

581

SOCRATES

What art makes cities agree about numbers?

582

ALCIBIADES

Arithmetic.

583

SOCRATES

And private individuals?

584

ALCIBIADES

The same.

585

SOCRATES

And what art makes each individual agree with himself?

586

ALCIBIADES

The same.

587

SOCRATES

And what art makes each of us agree with himself about the comparative length of the span and of the cubit?

Does not the art of measure?

588

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

589

SOCRATES

Individuals are agreed with one another about this; and states, equally?

590

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

591

SOCRATES

And the same holds of the balance?

592

ALCIBIADES

True.

593

SOCRATES

But what is the other agreement of which you speak, and about what?

what art can give that agreement?

And does that which gives it to the state give it also to the individual, so as to make him consistent with himself and with another?

594

ALCIBIADES

I should suppose so.

595

SOCRATES

But what is the nature of the agreement?—answer, and faint not.

596

ALCIBIADES

I mean to say that there should be such friendship and agreement as exists between an affectionate father and mother and their son, or between brothers, or between husband and wife.

597

SOCRATES

But can a man, Alcibiades, agree with a woman about the spinning of wool, which she understands and he does not?

598

ALCIBIADES

No, truly.

599

SOCRATES

Nor has he any need, for spinning is a female accomplishment.

600

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

601

SOCRATES

And would a woman agree with a man about the science of arms, which she has never learned?

602

ALCIBIADES

Certainly not.

603

SOCRATES

I suppose that the use of arms would be regarded by you as a male accomplishment?

604

ALCIBIADES

It would.

605

SOCRATES

Then, upon your view, women and men have two sorts of knowledge?

606

ALCIBIADES

Certainly.

607

SOCRATES

Then in their knowledge there is no agreement of women and men?

608

ALCIBIADES

There is not.

609

SOCRATES

Nor can there be friendship, if friendship is agreement?

610

ALCIBIADES

Plainly not.

611

SOCRATES

Then women are not loved by men when they do their own work?

612

ALCIBIADES

I suppose not.

613

SOCRATES

Nor men by women when they do their own work?

614

ALCIBIADES

No.

615

SOCRATES

Nor are states well administered, when individuals do their own work?

616

ALCIBIADES

I should rather think, Socrates, that the reverse is the truth.

(Compare Republic.)

617

SOCRATES

What!

do you mean to say that states are well administered when friendship is absent, the presence of which, as we were saying, alone secures their good order?

618

ALCIBIADES

But I should say that there is friendship among them, for this very reason, that the two parties respectively do their own work.

619

SOCRATES

That was not what you were saying before; and what do you mean now by affirming that friendship exists when there is no agreement?

How can there be agreement about matters which the one party knows, and of which the other is in ignorance?

620

ALCIBIADES

Impossible.

621

SOCRATES

And when individuals are doing their own work, are they doing what is just or unjust?

622

ALCIBIADES

What is just, certainly.

623

SOCRATES

And when individuals do what is just in the state, is there no friendship among them?

624

ALCIBIADES

I suppose that there must be, Socrates.

625

SOCRATES

Then what do you mean by this friendship or agreement about which we must be wise and discreet in order that we may be good men?

I cannot make out where it exists or among whom; according to you, the same persons may sometimes have it, and sometimes not.

626

ALCIBIADES

But, indeed, Socrates, I do not know what I am saying; and I have long been, unconsciously to myself, in a most disgraceful state.

627

SOCRATES

Nevertheless, cheer up; at fifty, if you had discovered your deficiency, you would have been too old, and the time for taking care of yourself would have passed away, but yours is just the age at which the discovery should be made.

628

ALCIBIADES

And what should he do, Socrates, who would make the discovery?

629

SOCRATES

Answer questions, Alcibiades; and that is a process which, by the grace of God, if I may put any faith in my oracle, will be very improving to both of us.

630

ALCIBIADES

If I can be improved by answering, I will answer.

631

SOCRATES

And first of all, that we may not peradventure be deceived by appearances, fancying, perhaps, that we are taking care of ourselves when we are not, what is the meaning of a man taking care of himself?

and when does he take care?

Does he take care of himself when he takes care of what belongs to him?

632

ALCIBIADES

I should think so.

633

SOCRATES

When does a man take care of his feet?

Does he not take care of them when he takes care of that which belongs to his feet?

634

ALCIBIADES

I do not understand.

635

SOCRATES

Let me take the hand as an illustration; does not a ring belong to the finger, and to the finger only?

636

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

637

SOCRATES

And the shoe in like manner to the foot?

638

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

639

SOCRATES

And when we take care of our shoes, do we not take care of our feet?

640

ALCIBIADES

I do not comprehend, Socrates.

641

SOCRATES

But you would admit, Alcibiades, that to take proper care of a thing is a correct expression?

642

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

643

SOCRATES

And taking proper care means improving?

644

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

645

SOCRATES

And what is the art which improves our shoes?

646

ALCIBIADES

Shoemaking.

647

SOCRATES

Then by shoemaking we take care of our shoes?

648

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

649

SOCRATES

And do we by shoemaking take care of our feet, or by some other art which improves the feet?

650

ALCIBIADES

By some other art.

651

SOCRATES

And the same art improves the feet which improves the rest of the body?

652

ALCIBIADES

Very true.

653

SOCRATES

Which is gymnastic?

654

ALCIBIADES

Certainly.

655

SOCRATES

Then by gymnastic we take care of our feet, and by shoemaking of that which belongs to our feet?

656

ALCIBIADES

Very true.

657

SOCRATES

And by gymnastic we take care of our hands, and by the art of graving rings of that which belongs to our hands?

658

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

659

SOCRATES

And by gymnastic we take care of the body, and by the art of weaving and the other arts we take care of the things of the body?

660

ALCIBIADES

Clearly.

661

SOCRATES

Then the art which takes care of each thing is different from that which takes care of the belongings of each thing?

662

ALCIBIADES

True.

663

SOCRATES

Then in taking care of what belongs to you, you do not take care of yourself?

664

ALCIBIADES

Certainly not.

665

SOCRATES

For the art which takes care of our belongings appears not to be the same as that which takes care of ourselves?

666

ALCIBIADES

Clearly not.

667

SOCRATES

And now let me ask you what is the art with which we take care of ourselves?

668

ALCIBIADES

I cannot say.

669

SOCRATES

At any rate, thus much has been admitted, that the art is not one which makes any of our possessions, but which makes ourselves better?

670

ALCIBIADES

True.

671

SOCRATES

But should we ever have known what art makes a shoe better, if we did not know a shoe?

672

ALCIBIADES

Impossible.

673

SOCRATES

Nor should we know what art makes a ring better, if we did not know a ring?

674

ALCIBIADES

That is true.

675

SOCRATES

And can we ever know what art makes a man better, if we do not know what we are ourselves?

676

ALCIBIADES

Impossible.

677

SOCRATES

And is self-knowledge such an easy thing, and was he to be lightly esteemed who inscribed the text on the temple at Delphi?

Or is self-knowledge a difficult thing, which few are able to attain?

678

ALCIBIADES

At times I fancy, Socrates, that anybody can know himself; at other times the task appears to be very difficult.

679

SOCRATES

But whether easy or difficult, Alcibiades, still there is no other way; knowing what we are, we shall know how to take care of ourselves, and if we are ignorant we shall not know.

680

ALCIBIADES

That is true.

681

SOCRATES

Well, then, let us see in what way the self-existent can be discovered by us; that will give us a chance of discovering our own existence, which otherwise we can never know.

682

ALCIBIADES

You say truly.

683

SOCRATES

Come, now, I beseech you, tell me with whom you are conversing?—with whom but with me?

684

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

685

SOCRATES

As I am, with you?

686

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

687

SOCRATES

That is to say, I, Socrates, am talking?

688

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

689

SOCRATES

And Alcibiades is my hearer?

690

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

691

SOCRATES

And I in talking use words?

692

ALCIBIADES

Certainly.

693

SOCRATES

And talking and using words have, I suppose, the same meaning?

694

ALCIBIADES

To be sure.

695

SOCRATES

And the user is not the same as the thing which he uses?

696

ALCIBIADES

What do you mean?

697

SOCRATES

I will explain; the shoemaker, for example, uses a square tool, and a circular tool, and other tools for cutting?

698

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

699

SOCRATES

But the tool is not the same as the cutter and user of the tool?

700

ALCIBIADES

Of course not.

701

SOCRATES

And in the same way the instrument of the harper is to be distinguished from the harper himself?

702

ALCIBIADES

It is.

703

SOCRATES

Now the question which I asked was whether you conceive the user to be always different from that which he uses?

704

ALCIBIADES

I do.

705

SOCRATES

Then what shall we say of the shoemaker?

Does he cut with his tools only or with his hands?

706

ALCIBIADES

With his hands as well.

707

SOCRATES

He uses his hands too?

708

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

709

SOCRATES

And does he use his eyes in cutting leather?

710

ALCIBIADES

He does.

711

SOCRATES

And we admit that the user is not the same with the things which he uses?

712

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

713

SOCRATES

Then the shoemaker and the harper are to be distinguished from the hands and feet which they use?

714

ALCIBIADES

Clearly.

715

SOCRATES

And does not a man use the whole body?

716

ALCIBIADES

Certainly.

717

SOCRATES

And that which uses is different from that which is used?

718

ALCIBIADES

True.

719

SOCRATES

Then a man is not the same as his own body?

720

ALCIBIADES

That is the inference.

721

SOCRATES

What is he, then?

722

ALCIBIADES

I cannot say.

723

SOCRATES

Nay, you can say that he is the user of the body.

724

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

725

SOCRATES

And the user of the body is the soul?

726

ALCIBIADES

Yes, the soul.

727

SOCRATES

And the soul rules?

728

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

729

SOCRATES

Let me make an assertion which will, I think, be universally admitted.

730

ALCIBIADES

What is it?

731

SOCRATES

That man is one of three things.

732

ALCIBIADES

What are they?

733

SOCRATES

Soul, body, or both together forming a whole.

734

ALCIBIADES

Certainly.

735

SOCRATES

But did we not say that the actual ruling principle of the body is man?

736

ALCIBIADES

Yes, we did.

737

SOCRATES

And does the body rule over itself?

738

ALCIBIADES

Certainly not.

739

SOCRATES

It is subject, as we were saying?

740

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

741

SOCRATES

Then that is not the principle which we are seeking?

742

ALCIBIADES

It would seem not.

743

SOCRATES

But may we say that the union of the two rules over the body, and consequently that this is man?

744

ALCIBIADES

Very likely.

745

SOCRATES

The most unlikely of all things; for if one of the members is subject, the two united cannot possibly rule.

746

ALCIBIADES

True.

747

SOCRATES

But since neither the body, nor the union of the two, is man, either man has no real existence, or the soul is man?

748

ALCIBIADES

Just so.

749

SOCRATES

Is anything more required to prove that the soul is man?

750

ALCIBIADES

Certainly not; the proof is, I think, quite sufficient.

751

SOCRATES

And if the proof, although not perfect, be sufficient, we shall be satisfied;—more precise proof will be supplied when we have discovered that which we were led to omit, from a fear that the enquiry would be too much protracted.

752

ALCIBIADES

What was that?

753

SOCRATES

What I meant, when I said that absolute existence must be first considered; but now, instead of absolute existence, we have been considering the nature of individual existence, and this may, perhaps, be sufficient; for surely there is nothing which may be called more properly ourselves than the soul?

754

ALCIBIADES

There is nothing.

755

SOCRATES

Then we may truly conceive that you and I are conversing with one another, soul to soul?

756

ALCIBIADES

Very true.

757

SOCRATES

And that is just what I was saying before—that I, Socrates, am not arguing or talking with the face of Alcibiades, but with the real Alcibiades; or in other words, with his soul.

758

ALCIBIADES

True.

759

SOCRATES

Then he who bids a man know himself, would have him know his soul?

760

ALCIBIADES

That appears to be true.

761

SOCRATES

He whose knowledge only extends to the body, knows the things of a man, and not the man himself?

762

ALCIBIADES

That is true.

763

SOCRATES

Then neither the physician regarded as a physician, nor the trainer regarded as a trainer, knows himself?

764

ALCIBIADES

He does not.

765

SOCRATES

The husbandmen and the other craftsmen are very far from knowing themselves, for they would seem not even to know their own belongings?

When regarded in relation to the arts which they practise they are even further removed from self-knowledge, for they only know the belongings of the body, which minister to the body.

766

ALCIBIADES

That is true.

767

SOCRATES

Then if temperance is the knowledge of self, in respect of his art none of them is temperate?

768

ALCIBIADES

I agree.

769

SOCRATES

And this is the reason why their arts are accounted vulgar, and are not such as a good man would practise?

770

ALCIBIADES

Quite true.

771

SOCRATES

Again, he who cherishes his body cherishes not himself, but what belongs to him?

772

ALCIBIADES

That is true.

773

SOCRATES

But he who cherishes his money, cherishes neither himself nor his belongings, but is in a stage yet further removed from himself?

774

ALCIBIADES

I agree.

775

SOCRATES

Then the money-maker has really ceased to be occupied with his own concerns?

776

ALCIBIADES

True.

777

SOCRATES

And if any one has fallen in love with the person of Alcibiades, he loves not Alcibiades, but the belongings of Alcibiades?

778

ALCIBIADES

True.

779

SOCRATES

But he who loves your soul is the true lover?

780

ALCIBIADES

That is the necessary inference.

781

SOCRATES

The lover of the body goes away when the flower of youth fades?

782

ALCIBIADES

True.

783

SOCRATES

But he who loves the soul goes not away, as long as the soul follows after virtue?

784

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

785

SOCRATES

And I am the lover who goes not away, but remains with you, when you are no longer young and the rest are gone?

786

ALCIBIADES

Yes, Socrates; and therein you do well, and I hope that you will remain.

787

SOCRATES

Then you must try to look your best.

788

ALCIBIADES

I will.

789

SOCRATES

The fact is, that there is only one lover of Alcibiades the son of Cleinias; there neither is nor ever has been seemingly any other; and he is his darling,—Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus and Phaenarete.

790

ALCIBIADES

True.

791

SOCRATES

And did you not say, that if I had not spoken first, you were on the point of coming to me, and enquiring why I only remained?

792

ALCIBIADES

That is true.

793

SOCRATES

The reason was that I loved you for your own sake, whereas other men love what belongs to you; and your beauty, which is not you, is fading away, just as your true self is beginning to bloom.

And I will never desert you, if you are not spoiled and deformed by the Athenian people; for the danger which I most fear is that you will become a lover of the people and will be spoiled by them.

Many a noble Athenian has been ruined in this way.

For the demus of the great-hearted Erechteus is of a fair countenance, but you should see him naked; wherefore observe the caution which I give you.

794

ALCIBIADES

What caution?

795

SOCRATES

Practise yourself, sweet friend, in learning what you ought to know, before you enter on politics; and then you will have an antidote which will keep you out of harm's way.

796

ALCIBIADES

Good advice, Socrates, but I wish that you would explain to me in what way I am to take care of myself.

797

SOCRATES

Have we not made an advance?

for we are at any rate tolerably well agreed as to what we are, and there is no longer any danger, as we once feared, that we might be taking care not of ourselves, but of something which is not ourselves.

798

ALCIBIADES

That is true.

799

SOCRATES

And the next step will be to take care of the soul, and look to that?

800

ALCIBIADES

Certainly.

801

SOCRATES

Leaving the care of our bodies and of our properties to others?

802

ALCIBIADES

Very good.

803

SOCRATES

But how can we have a perfect knowledge of the things of the soul?—For if we know them, then I suppose we shall know ourselves.

Can we really be ignorant of the excellent meaning of the Delphian inscription, of which we were just now speaking?

804

ALCIBIADES

What have you in your thoughts, Socrates?

805

SOCRATES

I will tell you what I suspect to be the meaning and lesson of that inscription.

Let me take an illustration from sight, which I imagine to be the only one suitable to my purpose.

806

ALCIBIADES

What do you mean?

807

SOCRATES

Consider; if some one were to say to the eye, 'See thyself,' as you might say to a man, 'Know thyself,' what is the nature and meaning of this precept?

Would not his meaning be: —That the eye should look at that in which it would see itself?

808

ALCIBIADES

Clearly.

809

SOCRATES

And what are the objects in looking at which we see ourselves?

810

ALCIBIADES

Clearly, Socrates, in looking at mirrors and the like.

811

SOCRATES

Very true; and is there not something of the nature of a mirror in our own eyes?

812

ALCIBIADES

Certainly.

813

SOCRATES

Did you ever observe that the face of the person looking into the eye of another is reflected as in a mirror; and in the visual organ which is over against him, and which is called the pupil, there is a sort of image of the person looking?

814

ALCIBIADES

That is quite true.

815

SOCRATES

Then the eye, looking at another eye, and at that in the eye which is most perfect, and which is the instrument of vision, will there see itself?

816

ALCIBIADES

That is evident.

817

SOCRATES

But looking at anything else either in man or in the world, and not to what resembles this, it will not see itself?

818

ALCIBIADES

Very true.

819

SOCRATES

Then if the eye is to see itself, it must look at the eye, and at that part of the eye where sight which is the virtue of the eye resides?

820

ALCIBIADES

True.

821

SOCRATES

And if the soul, my dear Alcibiades, is ever to know herself, must she not look at the soul; and especially at that part of the soul in which her virtue resides, and to any other which is like this?

822

ALCIBIADES

I agree, Socrates.

823

SOCRATES

And do we know of any part of our souls more divine than that which has to do with wisdom and knowledge?

824

ALCIBIADES

There is none.

825

SOCRATES

Then this is that part of the soul which resembles the divine; and he who looks at this and at the whole class of things divine, will be most likely to know himself?

826

ALCIBIADES

Clearly.

827

SOCRATES

And self-knowledge we agree to be wisdom?

828

ALCIBIADES

True.

829

SOCRATES

But if we have no self-knowledge and no wisdom, can we ever know our own good and evil?

830

ALCIBIADES

How can we, Socrates?

831

SOCRATES

You mean, that if you did not know Alcibiades, there would be no possibility of your knowing that what belonged to Alcibiades was really his?

832

ALCIBIADES

It would be quite impossible.

833

SOCRATES

Nor should we know that we were the persons to whom anything belonged, if we did not know ourselves?

834

ALCIBIADES

How could we?

835

SOCRATES

And if we did not know our own belongings, neither should we know the belongings of our belongings?

836

ALCIBIADES

Clearly not.

837

SOCRATES

Then we were not altogether right in acknowledging just now that a man may know what belongs to him and yet not know himself; nay, rather he cannot even know the belongings of his belongings; for the discernment of the things of self, and of the things which belong to the things of self, appear all to be the business of the same man, and of the same art.

838

ALCIBIADES

So much may be supposed.

839

SOCRATES

And he who knows not the things which belong to himself, will in like manner be ignorant of the things which belong to others?

840

ALCIBIADES

Very true.

841

SOCRATES

And if he knows not the affairs of others, he will not know the affairs of states?

842

ALCIBIADES

Certainly not.

843

SOCRATES

Then such a man can never be a statesman?

844

ALCIBIADES

He cannot.

845

SOCRATES

Nor an economist?

846

ALCIBIADES

He cannot.

847

SOCRATES

He will not know what he is doing?

848

ALCIBIADES

He will not.

849

SOCRATES

And will not he who is ignorant fall into error?

850

ALCIBIADES

Assuredly.

851

SOCRATES

And if he falls into error will he not fail both in his public and private capacity?

852

ALCIBIADES

Yes, indeed.

853

SOCRATES

And failing, will he not be miserable?

854

ALCIBIADES

Very.

855

SOCRATES

And what will become of those for whom he is acting?

856

ALCIBIADES

They will be miserable also.

857

SOCRATES

Then he who is not wise and good cannot be happy?

858

ALCIBIADES

He cannot.

859

SOCRATES

The bad, then, are miserable?

860

ALCIBIADES

Yes, very.

861

SOCRATES

And if so, not he who has riches, but he who has wisdom, is delivered from his misery?

862

ALCIBIADES

Clearly.

863

SOCRATES

Cities, then, if they are to be happy, do not want walls, or triremes, or docks, or numbers, or size, Alcibiades, without virtue?

(Compare Arist.

Pol.)

864

ALCIBIADES

Indeed they do not.

865

SOCRATES

And you must give the citizens virtue, if you mean to administer their affairs rightly or nobly?

866

ALCIBIADES

Certainly.

867

SOCRATES

But can a man give that which he has not?

868

ALCIBIADES

Impossible.

869

SOCRATES

Then you or any one who means to govern and superintend, not only himself and the things of himself, but the state and the things of the state, must in the first place acquire virtue.

870

ALCIBIADES

That is true.

871

SOCRATES

You have not therefore to obtain power or authority, in order to enable you to do what you wish for yourself and the state, but justice and wisdom.

872

ALCIBIADES

Clearly.

873

SOCRATES

You and the state, if you act wisely and justly, will act according to the will of God?

874

ALCIBIADES

Certainly.

875

SOCRATES

As I was saying before, you will look only at what is bright and divine, and act with a view to them?

876

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

877

SOCRATES

In that mirror you will see and know yourselves and your own good?

878

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

879

SOCRATES

And so you will act rightly and well?

880

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

881

SOCRATES

In which case, I will be security for your happiness.

882

ALCIBIADES

I accept the security.

883

SOCRATES

But if you act unrighteously, your eye will turn to the dark and godless, and being in darkness and ignorance of yourselves, you will probably do deeds of darkness.

884

ALCIBIADES

Very possibly.

885

SOCRATES

For if a man, my dear Alcibiades, has the power to do what he likes, but has no understanding, what is likely to be the result, either to him as an individual or to the state—for example, if he be sick and is able to do what he likes, not having the mind of a physician—having moreover tyrannical power, and no one daring to reprove him, what will happen to him?

Will he not be likely to have his constitution ruined?

886

ALCIBIADES

That is true.

887

SOCRATES

Or again, in a ship, if a man having the power to do what he likes, has no intelligence or skill in navigation, do you see what will happen to him and to his fellow-sailors?

888

ALCIBIADES

Yes; I see that they will all perish.

889

SOCRATES

And in like manner, in a state, and where there is any power and authority which is wanting in virtue, will not misfortune, in like manner, ensue?

890

ALCIBIADES

Certainly.

891

SOCRATES

Not tyrannical power, then, my good Alcibiades, should be the aim either of individuals or states, if they would be happy, but virtue.

892

ALCIBIADES

That is true.

893

SOCRATES

And before they have virtue, to be commanded by a superior is better for men as well as for children?

(Compare Arist.

Pol.)

894

ALCIBIADES

That is evident.

895

SOCRATES

And that which is better is also nobler?

896

ALCIBIADES

True.

897

SOCRATES

And what is nobler is more becoming?

898

ALCIBIADES

Certainly.

899

SOCRATES

Then to the bad man slavery is more becoming, because better?

900

ALCIBIADES

True.

901

SOCRATES

Then vice is only suited to a slave?

902

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

903

SOCRATES

And virtue to a freeman?

904

ALCIBIADES

Yes.

905

SOCRATES

And, O my friend, is not the condition of a slave to be avoided?

906

ALCIBIADES

Certainly, Socrates.

907

SOCRATES

And are you now conscious of your own state?

And do you know whether you are a freeman or not?

908

ALCIBIADES

I think that I am very conscious indeed of my own state.

909

SOCRATES

And do you know how to escape out of a state which I do not even like to name to my beauty?

910

ALCIBIADES

Yes, I do.

911

SOCRATES

How?

912

ALCIBIADES

By your help, Socrates.

913

SOCRATES

That is not well said, Alcibiades.

914

ALCIBIADES

What ought I to have said?

915

SOCRATES

By the help of God.

916

ALCIBIADES

I agree; and I further say, that our relations are likely to be reversed.

From this day forward, I must and will follow you as you have followed me; I will be the disciple, and you shall be my master.

917

SOCRATES

O that is rare!

My love breeds another love: and so like the stork I shall be cherished by the bird whom I have hatched.

918

ALCIBIADES

Strange, but true; and henceforward I shall begin to think about justice.

919

SOCRATES

And I hope that you will persist; although I have fears, not because I doubt you; but I see the power of the state, which may be too much for both of us.

920